Italian Citizenship Reform: What You Need to Know Now

Author: Avvocato Maria Marinello

Preliminary Notes and Reflections on the Italian Reform on Citizenship

As a preliminary note, it should be stated that at present, Draft Law No. 1432, containing the text of the so-called Decreto Tajani (Decree-Law of March 28, 2025), is currently under discussion in the Italian Parliament (the Senate has approved the version of the text adopted in the drafting session by the Standing Committee on Constitutional Affairs on May 15). At present, there is no final and definitive version of the law. The draft law may be subject to numerous proposed amendments, which may or may not be approved and included in the final text during the parliamentary debate. It is emphasized that, should the Parliament approve a version of the law different from the one passed by the Senate, the draft will need to return to the Senate for further review and approval. All steps must be completed by May 27, 2025.

Possible Future Scenarios for Applicants Claiming Citizenship Beyond the Second Generation

1. Possible Future Scenarios for Applicants Claiming Citizenship Beyond the Second Generation

In its original version, the Decreto Tajani excludes the possibility of recognizing jure sanguinis citizenship beyond the second generation. However, in light of the above premise (namely, that the Decree has yet to be converted into law and that the draft law could undergo significant changes in this regard), two brief reflections are warranted.

First and foremost, one of the main critical issues of the Decreto Tajani—already widely challenged both politically and legally—is its failure to provide for a transitional period. The immediate, retroactive, and unexpected application of such a major legislative reform in a highly sensitive area, without any limitations or transitional provisions, creates the risk of unjust consequences even for those who, prior to its entry into force (i.e., before March 28, 2025), had already clearly initiated the process for the recognition of Italian citizenship by beginning the long and complex process of gathering the required documentation, or by unsuccessfully attempting to schedule an appointment with the competent Consulate.

This introduces a kind of “guillotine” mechanism, resulting in the immediate, retroactive, and sudden deprivation of Italian citizenship. Potentially, this could lead to the extinction of an already existing and fully vested right, since the Decree—in its current form—introduces a general and retroactive rule, without any time limit, that applies to an indeterminate group of individuals.

As is well known, before March 28, 2025, Italian citizenship could originally be acquired at birth by descent from an Italian father or mother (Art. 4 of the Civil Code of 1865; Art. 1 of Law No. 555/1912; Art. 1 of Law No. 91/1992).

In this context, it would be both legitimate and reasonable to argue that individuals born before the entry into force of the Decree-Law must be recognized as Italian citizens by vested right (i.e., based on the legal framework in place prior to the current reform), even if born abroad and even if they had not yet exercised the rights deriving from their citizenship status. This applies even more strongly in cases where they had already taken concrete steps (such as those discussed here) to obtain formal recognition of their citizenship.

In this context, the absence of a transitional regime allowing for the submission of multi-generational citizenship claims contradicts fundamental principles of the Italian legal system (see Art. 12 of the Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code). This critical issue has already been raised during parliamentary debate, and it is therefore hoped that the final version of the law will include a transitional window (with an intermediate regime more consistent with Italian constitutional values) allowing for the submission of multi-generational citizenship claims.

In any case, due to the same concerns of potential unconstitutionality, it is believed that such claims will remain judicially admissible in the future. The legislature cannot absolutely and generally prevent the exercise and legal protection of subjective rights, such as the right to citizenship, by generically and abstractly barring the filing of claims solely on the basis of a calendar date.

2. Application of Pre- and Post-Decree Laws in Judicial Proceedings

Judicial authorities currently examining claims submitted before and after the entry into force of the Decreto Tajani will nonetheless be required to distinguish cases based on the date of submission, applying the law in effect at the time each case was filed. This is in accordance with the general legal principle of tempus regit actum (the time governs the act), a principle particularly difficult to override in judicial proceedings. (On this point, see also a recent ruling by the Court of Campobasso dated May 1, 2025.)

However, clarifications are necessary.

First, it is essential to define what constitutes the “initiation of the procedure” and determine the relevant date for establishing the applicable law. Given the document-based nature of the citizenship recognition process, it is believed that the procedure should be considered officially initiated at the moment when the applicant begins the complex and lengthy task of collecting the required documentation.

Similarly, in cases where applicants unsuccessfully attempted to schedule an appointment with the competent Consulate (and, due to delays attributable solely to the Administration, were unable to submit their application before the reform), it may be validly argued in court that the date of the first attempt to request an appointment (and the subsequent negative response) marks the official start of the process for the purposes of determining the applicable law.

In any case, it should be noted that the final version of the law—which, it must be emphasized once again to avoid confusion and misrepresentation, does not yet exist and therefore cannot be challenged in any judicial forum—may include a more or less broad transitional period to regulate the application of different laws over time to various situations.